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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit tax-exempt organizations, particularly those 
accorded Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status (commonly referred to as “charities”1) or that undertake 
 
       † The authors are principals in the Minneapolis firm, Borenstein and 
McVeigh Law Office LLC.  The firm provides services primarily to nonprofit 
charitable organizations in the areas of corporate, employment and tax law.  
Thanks to Mathea Bulander for legal research in preparation for this article. 
 1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 
defines a category of exemption from income taxation, with attendant other 
1
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community benefit efforts beyond their membership as described 
in I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)2 have faced increasing demands for public 
accountability for most of the last decade.  For example, copies of 
filed Annual Returns of Exempt Organizations (Form 990 series), 
which disclose a plethora of financial and other information on 
each year’s operations, must be provided to anyone who asks for 
them within a three-year period.3  In addition, most charities’ 
Forms 990 are posted on the Internet and readily accessible to the 
public.4  Public charities and other so-called “public benefit” 
 
benefits beyond tax exemption.  (The same numbering was found in the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954.)  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) enumerates as qualified for income-
tax exemption entities operated for one or more of eight specific purposes, 
including in its list religious, educational, or charitable purposes.  Entities holding 
such status, regardless of which purpose(s) they serve, are commonly referred to 
as “charities” or “charitable organizations.”  As a further complication to the 
lexicon, entities that are described as exempt under § 501(c)(3) are further 
classified under I.R.C. §§ 508 and 509 as either private foundations or non-private 
foundations, and the colloquial expression long-accepted for the latter 
classification is the term “public charity.”  Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references and citations in this article to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) refer 
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, currently located at 26 
U.S.C.A. (West 2004).   
 2. Entities that are “not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the 
promotion of social welfare . . . and the net earnings of which are devoted 
exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.” I.R.C. § 
501(c)(4)(a). 
 3. I.R.C. § 6104(e), added in 1987, imposed a “public inspection” (as 
opposed to hardcopy dissemination) requirement on both exempt organizations’ 
exemption applications and annual returns (except for private foundations’ 
annual returns, which were already subject to certain public availability 
requirements).  Nine years later, the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights II expanded the 
requirements to include hardcopy dissemination of those same filings, but 
postponed the effective date until sixty days after the issuance of Final Income Tax 
Regulations.  Pub. L. No. 104-68, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (amending I.R.C. § 
1313(a)).  Legislation in 1998 brought private foundations’ annual returns into 
the scheme and deleted I.R.C. § 6104(e), moving these requirements to I.R.C. § 
6104(d).  Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).  Hard copy dissemination of 
Forms 990 (or the alternative, Forms 990-EZ) was required as of June 8, 1999, 
while hard copy dissemination of Forms 990-PF (required for private foundations) 
was effective on March 13, 2000. 
 4. This is largely the result of the advent of the Internet site Guidestar.org.  
http://www.guidestar.org.  Anyone with access to the Internet can use the site to 
search the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) database of 501(c)(3)-registered 
organizations and to retrieve information on the organization including Forms 
990 on the tax years begun in 1997 and in successive years for those in the IRS 
database or those that have been added at their own initiative (as imperfections 
exist in the IRS database).  The IRS provides the forms themselves to the web site 
sponsor, Philanthropic Research, Inc. (PRI), under a process that was initially 
undertaken as a collaboration between the IRS, PRI, and the National Center for 
2
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nonprofits that are accorded 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status are 
subject to a tax scheme that imposes an excise tax if transactions 
undertaken with certain parties fail to be at arm’s length.  That 
regulatory scheme taxes both the individual receiving the “excess 
benefit” and directors who approved the payment.5  Furthermore, 
IRS regulations state aspirational standards for boards of directors 
to document precisely the process by which compensation 
decisions are made for individuals who exercise substantial 
influence over their organizations.6  In the wake of the scandals at 
major corporations such as Enron and WorldCom, attorneys 
general of several states are proposing additional legislative reforms 
to ensure financial accountability of nonprofit organizations, and 
both the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means 
Committee have recently held hearings on proposed reforms for 
exempt organizations. 
These increasing demands for accountability have, in turn, 
amplified the pressure on boards of directors of all nonprofit 
organizations to govern effectively.  But what is effective 
governance in this new climate of accountability, particularly for 
organizations holding exalted status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and 
concomitant “public charity” status under 509(a)?  This article will 
review current developments in the area of fiduciary duty of boards 
 
Charitable Statistics.  At present the site posts Forms 990 of approximately 290,000 
charitable organizations, redacting only donors’ identifying information, as well as 
signatures.  Some charities post their own Form 990 filings to a web address of 
their own choice as a mechanism to satisfy I.R.C. § 6104(d) with respect to the 
requirement that they otherwise provide copies of returns upon written or in-
person request.  See supra, note 3 (explaining I.R.C. § 6104(d)). 
 5. I.R.C. § 4958, added in 1996 via enactment of the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights 
II,  actually was given retroactive effect, covering transactions back to September 
14, 1995.  Pub. L. No. 104-68, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).  However, the need for 
regulatory address of the statute’s definitions, application, and minutiae resulted 
in three Treasury Department pronouncements and resultant delay in 
enforcement of the statute.  Proposed regulations were initially issued on August 
4, 1998, followed by temporary regulations on January 10, 2001 and final 
regulations on January 23, 2002.  63 Fed. Reg. 41,486 (proposed Aug. 4, 1998); 66 
Fed. Reg. 2144 (proposed Jan. 10, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 3076 (proposed Jan. 23, 
2002) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4958).  I.R.C. § 4958 applies to all 501(c)(3) 
organizations except those holding private foundation classification, and also 
reaches organizations described in 501(c)(4) (in the latter instance, regardless of 
whether exemption has been applied for, if the organization holds itself out as so 
exempt).  Given its scheme of applying to transactions with certain insiders for a 
period of sixty months following their loss of such relationship or status, I.R.C. § 
4958 also covers revoked 501(c)(3)s and 501(c)(4)s for a sixty-month period 
following their loss of exemption.  
 6. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2002). 
3
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of directors of nonprofit tax-exempt organizations, to suggest what 
current trends indicate may be enhanced definitions of directors’ 
fiduciary duties in the post-Enron environment. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LAW GOVERNING FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Legal duties of officers and directors to the corporations they 
govern have developed from the same principles as those 
applicable to trustees.  In early cases, directors of all corporations 
were found to owe a duty to the corporation similar to that which a 
trustee owes to a beneficiary.7  Later cases questioned the strictness 
of that standard, and courts began to define the duties that 
nonprofit directors owed to their organizations more in line with 
the fiduciary standards that directors of business organizations 
owed to their organizations.8  For example, the Federal District 
Court for the District of Columbia notes in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes 
National Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries that the 
“modern trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in 
determining the liability of directors of charitable corporations.”9 
A. Duty of Care 
In 1987, the American Bar Association promulgated the 
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (the “Revised Model 
Act”), which also included the corporate standard for the duty of 
care.  Minnesota, among other states, adopted a version of the 
Revised Model Act in 1988 as Minnesota Statutes chapter 317A.10  
Chapter 317A replaced the former chapter 317 in 1989.11 
Minnesota Statutes section 317A.251 sets out the standard of 
care for directors that comports to the Revised Model Act, 
requiring a director to discharge his or her duties “in good faith, 
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the 
 
 7. People v. Larkin, 413 F. Supp. 978, 982 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Burden v. 
Burden, 54 N.E. 17, 23 (N.Y. 1899); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 199-200 (2004). 
 8. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & 
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 9. Id. 
 10. MINN. STAT. § 317A (2004). 
 11. See id. § 317A. 
4
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director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.”12  A parallel provision applies to nonprofit corporate 
officers.13 The duty of care embodied in these statutes generally 
requires directors to carry out their responsibilities by staying 
informed about the organization’s activities and acting to ensure 
that directors’ decisions are made in good faith and with the intent 
to further the organization’s purposes.14 
In an effort to limit the personal liability exposure of nonprofit 
directors, several states have adopted statutory protections, 
providing that a director is not liable to the corporation for an act 
or omission unless that director’s actions are clearly self-interested, 
in bad faith, or grossly negligent.15  As of January 1, 2003, a total of 
thirty-one states had adopted such statutes, “although sixteen of the 
statutes apply only if the director serves without compensation.”16 
Minnesota expanded the protections available to nonprofit 
directors in 2003, when the Minnesota Supreme Court, in a case of 
first impression, found that the “business judgment rule” applies to 
shield nonprofit boards of directors from liability for decisions 
made in good faith, where the director is disinterested, reasonably 
informed, and honestly acting in a manner he or she believes to be 
in the best interest of the corporation.17  In Janssen v. Best & 
Flanagan, the court found that several states explicitly apply the 
business judgment rule to decisions made by nonprofit boards of 
directors, while no other states deny application of the rule to 
nonprofit board decisions.18  The court reasoned as follows: 
In addition to finding support in other jurisdictions for 
giving judicial deference to nonprofit corporate decisions, 
the primary rationales for applying the business judgment 
 
 12. Id. § 317A.251.  
 13. Id. § 317A.361. 
 14. See generally id. § 317A (2004).  As noted below, these statutes are read to 
embody duties of loyalty and obedience.  See infra parts II.B, II.C. 
 15. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5239(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ch. 
617.0834(1)(b)(3) (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.2209(c) (2004). 
 16. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 7, at 226.  See MINN. STAT. §317A.257, subd. 1 
(2004) (providing that generally a person who serves without compensation as a 
director, officer, trustee, member or agent of an organization exempt from state 
income taxation under Minnesota Statutes section 290.05, subdivision 2, is not 
civilly liable for an act or omission by that person if the act or omission was in 
good faith, was within the scope of the person’s responsibilities as a director, 
officer, trustee, member, etc., and did not constitute willful or reckless 
misconduct). 
 17. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003). 
 18. Id. at 883. 
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rule in the for-profit context apply in the nonprofit 
context as well. Organizations are autonomous agents that 
should control their own destiny.  Directors of nonprofits 
may take fewer risks than would be optimal if they were 
overly concerned about liability for well-meaning 
decisions.  Additionally, courts are not well-equipped to 
scrutinize the decisions of a corporation; judges should 
not be caught in the middle of fighting factions of 
nonprofits any more than they should be thrust between 
dissatisfied shareholders and profit-seeking boards.  
Therefore, we conclude that the boards of nonprofit 
corporations may receive the protection of the business 
judgment rule.19 
B. Duty of Loyalty 
Generally, the duty of loyalty requires that corporate directors 
and officers act in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed 
to be in accordance with the best interests of the corporation.20  As 
with the duty of care, Minnesota applies the duty of loyalty to 
directors through the reach of Minnesota Statutes section 
317A.251,21 and to officers through Minnesota Statutes section 
317A.361.22  Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255 speaks to and 
expands aspirationally the duty of loyalty for directors, providing a 
procedure for boards of directors to follow when conflicts of 
interest arise that applies a higher level of scrutiny for transactions 
with directors and parties to whom they are related.23  To such end, 
Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255, subdivision 1 defines the 
situations in which a “conflict of interest” exists with respect to the 
corporation entering into contracts or transactions and then 
provides for a “safe harbor” directors’ procedure that renders such 
corporate actions not void or voidable.24  The situations in which 
contracts or transactions would otherwise be void or voidable are: 
A contract or other transaction between a corporation 
 
 19. Id. (citations omitted). 
 20. See, e.g. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and 
Officers:  Paradoxes, Problems and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 641 (1998) 
(quoting DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NON-PROFIT DIRECTORS  21 
(1988)). 
 21.  MINN. STAT. § 317A.251 (2004). 
 22. Id. § 317A.361. 
 23. Id. § 317A.255. 
 24. Id.  See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
6
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and: (1) its director or a member of the family of its 
director; (2) a director of a related organization, or a 
member of the family of a director of a related 
organization; or (3) an organization in or of which the 
corporation’s director, or a member of the family of its 
director, is a director, officer or legal representative or has 
a material financial interest.25 
Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255, subdivision 2 fails to give 
a substantive definition of what constitutes a “material financial 
interest,” but sets out that: 
(1) [A] director does not have a material financial interest 
in a resolution fixing the compensation of the director or 
fixing the compensation of another director as a director, 
officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, even 
though the first director is also receiving compensation 
from the corporation; and 
(2) [A] director has a material financial interest in an 
organization in which the director, or a member of the 
family of the director, has a material financial interest.26 
In spite of the lack of statutory definition, “material financial 
interests” are commonly understood to be those in which a 
remunerative or exchange return is expected.  Thus, it would be a 
“material financial interest” for an individual to have rights 
(whether or not yet vested) to be paid compensation, employee or 
retiree benefits, dividends, or profit-sharing, or to have their 
expenses reimbursed or obligations or other liabilities repaid, etc.  
Similarly, exchange transactions (for example a sale of property) 
would give rise to the participant’s “material financial interest.” 
By specifically addressing what procedures, if followed by 
directors (or others) would render such a “conflict of interest” 
contract or transaction not voidable, the statute touches on only 
one aspect of directors’ duty of loyalty. 27  Also encompassed within 
 
 25. MINN. STAT. § 317A.255 (2004). 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. Minnesota Statutes section 317A.255 sets out the specific scenarios in 
which a director’s conflict(s) of interest will cause a transaction to be void or 
voidable, and outlines procedures that may be undertaken by the board of 
directors to refute that consequence: 
 
Subdivision 1.    Conflict; procedure when conflict arises. 
 
(a) A contract or other transaction between a corporation and:  (1) its 
director or a member of the family of its director; (2) a director of a 
7
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the duty of loyalty that directors (and, under Minnesota law, 
officers) hold is the requirement that the corporation’s 
information be kept confidential to the extent that the information 
is privileged or that its release would compromise the corporation’s 
opportunities; and that directors (and officers) refrain from actions 
that are detrimental to the corporation’s interests (including 
“taking” an opportunity of the corporation). 
Recent cases interpreting the duty of loyalty addressed the 
latter point and held that a corporate officer breached his fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to a Minnesota nonprofit corporation.  In Shepherd of 
the Valley Lutheran Church of Hastings v. Hope Lutheran Church of 
Hastings,28 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a vice-
president of a congregation breached his fiduciary duty when he 
purposefully withheld material information from other officers and 
members of the congregation of Shepherd of the Valley Lutheran 
 
related organization, or a member of the family of a director of a related 
organization; or  (3) an organization in or of which the corporation's 
director, or a member of the family of its director, is a director, officer, or 
legal representative or has a material financial interest; is not void or 
voidable because the director or the other individual or organization are parties or 
because the director is present at the meeting of the members or the board or a 
committee at which the contract or transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified, 
if a requirement of paragraph (b) is satisfied. 
 
(b) A contract or transaction described in paragraph (a) is not void or 
voidable if: 
 
(1) the contract or transaction was, and the person asserting the validity 
of the contract or transaction has the burden of establishing that the 
contract or transaction was, fair and reasonable as to the corporation 
when it was  authorized, approved, or ratified; 
 
(2) the material facts as to the contract or transaction  and as to the 
director's interest are fully disclosed or known  to the members and the 
contract or transaction is approved in  good faith by two-thirds of the 
members entitled to vote, not counting any vote that the interested 
director might otherwise  have, or the unanimous affirmative vote of all 
members, whether or not entitled to vote; 
 
(3) the material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the director's 
interest are fully disclosed or known to the board or a committee, and the board or 
committee authorizes, approves, or ratifies the contract or transaction in good faith 
by a majority of the board or committee, not counting any vote that the interested 
director might otherwise have, and not counting the director in determining the 
presence of a quorum. 
 
MINN. STAT. § 317A.255 (emphasis added). 
 28. 626 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1082 (2002). 
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Church in an attempt to create a competing congregation.29  The 
court noted that, in order to establish a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, a plaintiff must show that “the action attacked is so far 
opposed to the true interests of the corporation as to lead to the 
clear inference that no officer thus acting could have been 
influenced by an honest desire to secure such interests.”30  The 
court pointed out that the fiduciary duty of the officer extended to 
all members of the congregation, not just to those who were allied 
with him.31  In Mid-List Press v. Nora,32 the Federal District Court for 
the District of Minnesota, applying Minnesota law, held that the 
corporation’s founder and president violated his fiduciary duty 
when he misappropriated the corporation’s trade name and 
International Standard Book Numbers to publish his own book of 
poetry.33 
C. Duty of Obedience 
While the duty of obedience is not specifically identified in 
statutory definitions of fiduciary duties applicable to nonprofit 
boards and officers, this duty has become more accepted as a stand-
alone requirement with which directors and officers must comply.  
In its publication, “Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Charitable 
Organizations,” the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office lists the 
duty of obedience separately from the duties of care and loyalty, 
and includes the following as specific obligations under it: 
1. State and Federal Statutes. Directors should be familiar 
with state and federal statutes and laws relating to 
nonprofit corporations, charitable solicitations, sales and 
use taxes, FICA and income tax withholding, and 
unemployment and workers’ compensation obligations. 
They should also be familiar with the requirements of the 
Internal Revenue Service. Directors should see to it that 
their organization’s status with state and federal agencies 
is protected. 
 
 29. Id. at 442-43. 
 30. Id. at 442 (citing Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Minn. 1982), 
quoting Warner v. E.C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 573, 33 N.W.2d 721, 726 
(1948)). 
 31. Id.  See also Wenzel v. Mathies, 542 N.W.2d 634, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that a fiduciary duty is owed to all persons who have equal interests and 
concerns in the corporation and are subject to harm). 
 32. 275 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2003). 
 33. Id. at 1003-04. 
9
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2. Filing Requirements. Directors must comply with 
deadlines for tax and financial reporting, for registering 
with the Attorney General, for making social security 
payments, for income tax withholding, and so on. 
Additionally, if an organization is incorporated under the 
Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation Act, its directors have a 
duty to maintain its corporate status by submitting timely 
filings to the Secretary of State’s Office. 
3. Governing Documents. Directors should be familiar 
with their organization’s governing documents and 
should follow the provisions of those documents. 
Directors should be sure proper notice is given for 
meetings, that regular meetings are held, that directors 
are properly appointed and that the organization’s 
mission is being accomplished. 
4. Outside Help. Where appropriate, directors should 
obtain opinions of legal counsel or accountants.34 
D. State Attorney General Enforcement 
Recent enforcement efforts by state attorneys general have 
made it clear that nonprofit boards of directors will need to pay 
more than lip service to fiduciary duties set out in state statutes.35  
Developments in the nonprofit, tax-exempt healthcare community 
 
 34. MINN. ATT’Y GEN., FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS OF CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE FOR BOARD MEMBERS (2003), available at http://www. 
ag.state.mn.us/charities/charDuties.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 35. While this article focuses primarily on the enforcement efforts of the 
Minnesota Attorney General’s office, it should be noted that other attorneys 
general have stepped up enforcement efforts as well.  A July 19, 2004 ABA position 
paper prepared for the U.S. Senate Finance Committee hearing on July 22, 2004, 
notes the following developments:   
[I]n California the Attorney General has proposed the “Charity Integrity 
Bill” and the “Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, CA Senate Bill 1262” was 
introduced; . . . in Hawaii, the Attorney General proposes legislation that 
would give the Attorney General the authority to remove directors;  in 
Massachusetts, the Attorney General is proposing the “Act to Promote 
the Financial Integrity of Public Charities;” and in New York, the 
Attorney General has proposed the “Nonprofit Accountability Act” and 
the legislature has introduced S. 4836 on behalf of the Attorney General 
[requiring that the president or chief executive officer, or treasurer or 
chief financial officer of each nonprofit corporation shall verify the 
corporation’s annual report]. 
Letter from Richard A. Shaw, Chair, Section of Taxation, American Bar 
Association, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance, 
App. F, n.4 (July 19, 2004) [hereinafter ABA LETTER]. 
10
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that both predate and are eerily parallel to the Enron debacle of 
2001 are generally credited with generating this attention.  The 
Coalition for Nonprofit Healthcare published a “Corporate 
Responsibility Guidebook” in November 2002, which tracks the 
“corporate responsibility environment” as one informed by actions 
of Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch in pursuing the Allina 
organization in 2000-2001, but credits even before that (and 
outside of Minnesota): 
[T]he long-running saga of the bankruptcy and related 
litigation involving AHERF [Allegheny Health Education 
and Research Foundation], which began in 1998.  At its 
core, this controversy involved alleged failures of oversight 
by corporate governance and lapses in the monitoring of 
the financial integrity of the health system and the actions 
of certain members of senior management.  The 
bankruptcy, and ultimate settlement of ongoing litigation 
in 2002, result in the return of over $75 million to existing 
endowment funds . . . .  The high-profile AHERF failure 
(and resulting dissipation of charitable assets) has made 
state attorneys general increasingly sensitive to their 
obligation to monitor the degree of stewardship of 
charitable assets by governing boards.36 
Not only has the current Minnesota Attorney General been 
one of the country’s most proactive in pursuing organizations 
perceived to have lax board oversight and insider self-dealing,37 but 
his predecessor, Hubert H. Humphrey III, in office through the 
year 2000, led an investigation in 1998 which resulted in an 
agreement with one of Minnesota’s most beloved charitable 
institutions, Minnesota Public Radio, to the end of ensuring the 
board’s appropriate independent oversight in setting management 
 
 36. COALITION FOR NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
GUIDEBOOK 2 (2002), available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/pg/tax/docs/ 
tax_guidebook_0212.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).  
 37. In addition to Allina, Attorney General Mike Hatch pursued 
HealthPartners for alleged fiduciary lapses, with similar publicity of his staff’s 
investigative findings.  His office also asserted breach of fiduciary responsibility 
against the Board of Directors of Minnesota Partnership for Action Against 
Tobacco.  See Memorandum from Plaintiff State of Minnesota to Ramsey County 
District Court File C1-94-8565 (arguing by the Attorney General that the Board 
had a duty to act as a fiduciary for the State and the public in administering State 
funds received in settlement of tobacco litigation brought by the State of 
Minnesota against R.J. Reynolds and others, and failed to do so) (citing Shepherd 
of the Valley Lutheran Church of Hastings v. Hope Lutheran Church of Hastings, 
626 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1082 (2002)). 
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compensation.38 
Drawing on the statutory definitions of duties of directors of 
nonprofit organizations in Minnesota Statutes sections 317A.251 
and 317A.255, the Minnesota Attorney General’s website displays a 
series of policies for nonprofits to consider when developing 
standards to govern their operations and the conduct of board 
members, officers, directors, and employees.39 According to the 
Attorney General’s Office, its policies are offered as guides, and are 
based in part upon the policies adopted by Allina in connection 
with the Attorney General’s recent compliance investigation of that 
organization. 
With respect to conflicts of interest, the Minnesota Attorney 
General’s sample policy emphasizes that board members, officers 
and management employees owe the public a fiduciary duty, 
“which carries with it a broad and unbending duty of loyalty and 
fidelity.”40  The board, officers, and management employees have 
the responsibility to administer the affairs of the nonprofit tax-
exempt organization they govern “honestly and prudently, and [to 
exercise] their best care, skill, and judgment for the sole benefit of” 
their organization.41  Directors, officers, and management 
employees “shall exercise the utmost good faith in all transactions 
involved in their duties, and they shall not use their positions with 
[the organization] or knowledge gained therefrom for their 
personal benefit.  The interests of the organization must be the first 
priority in all decisions and actions.”42 
E. Internal Revenue Code 
A charitable organization must serve a public, rather than a 
private interest, in order to meet the “operational test” of I.R.C. § 
501(c)(3).43 A charitable organization is not operated exclusively 
for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole 
 
 38. Letter from Sheila S. Fishman, Manager, Charities Division, Minnesota 
Attorney General’s Office, to John E. Harris, Attorney, Faegre & Benson LLP (Jan. 
27, 1998) (on file with author).  
 39. See Minn. Att’y Gen. website, at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/charities/ 
Default.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 40. MINN. ATT’Y GEN., SAMPLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY  1 (2004), at 
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/pdf/charities/ConflictInterestPolicy.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2004). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
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or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals 
having a personal and private interest in the activities of the 
organization.44  These limitations have historically established an 
IRS counterpart, at least from a qualification perspective, that 
requires both charitable organizations and 501(c)(4) tax-exempt 
entities45 to ensure that directors adhere to the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty that is imposed on a state basis as set out in statutory and/or 
case law. 
Until 1996, the IRS was largely restricted in enforcing the 
prohibition on private inurement as the only action available to 
that agency was the revocation of exempt status from charitable 
organizations that had engaged in such transactions with directors 
or officers (or their family members).  While this penalty may have 
been effective to prevent the charitable organizations from 
engaging in these activities in the future, it did nothing to recoup 
improper payments of compensation or issuance of other benefits 
to the individuals who had received them, and perhaps served a 
countervailing purpose in ultimately causing the loss of programs 
when revocation signaled loss of gift or grant income. 
Congress added § 4958 to the I.R.C. in 1996.46  Through 
enactment of this section and its attendant regulations, the IRS 
gained new and far-reaching power shy of revocation, to assess 
excise taxes against certain individuals who receive unearned or 
excessive compensation or other benefits from a charitable 
organization (or other entities subject to the statute), and 
potentially upon even other fiduciaries of the charitable 
organization who approved the transaction, knowing it to convey 
“excess benefit.”47  Section 4958 and its regulatory implementation 
 
 44. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1990).  The term 
“private shareholder or individual” in § 501 refers to persons having a personal 
and private interest in the activities of the organization.  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-
1(c) (as amended in 1982). 
 45. The Code was amended in 1996 to include a “no private inurement” 
proscription for 501(c)(4) exemption.  See Taxpayers Bill of Rights 2, H.R. 2337, 
104th Cong. § 1311 (1996). 
 46. Id. (effective for transactions occurring on or after September 14, 1995).  
See supra note 5. 
 47. Id. I.R.C. § 4958 applies to all 501(c)(3) organizations except those 
classified as private foundations, to organizations described in 501(c)(4) (in the 
latter instance, regardless of whether exemption has been applied for, if the 
organization holds itself out as so exempt), and to entities who were revoked from 
501(c)(3) status while holding non-private foundation status or from 501(c)(4) 
status in the last 60 months.  See supra note 5. 
13
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are known as “intermediate sanctions,” as they represents an 
arsenal of sanctions available to the IRS short of revocation of the 
organization’s tax-exempt status. 
In general, § 4958 sanctions apply when a subject entity has 
engaged in an “excess benefit transaction”48 with one of its 
“disqualified persons.”  A “disqualified person” is a natural person 
or organization who was in a position of “substantial influence”49 
over the affairs of the organization at any time during the five-year 
period ending on the date of the transaction, as well as their family 
members and parties in certain relationships to one or more 
disqualified persons.50 An “excess benefit transaction” is one where 
an economic benefit is provided by an applicable organization 
directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person, 
and the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value 
of the consideration (including the performance of services) 
received by the organization for providing such benefit.51  For 
purposes of the intermediate sanctions regulations, the term 
“compensation” is broad, and includes all forms of cash and non-
cash compensation, or benefits including salary, bonuses, deferred 
compensation which is earned and vested, premiums for liability, 
or any other insurance coverage and other types of benefits 
(whether or not includable in taxable income).52 
It is important to note that Congress provided what is in 
essence a “safe-harbor” for boards of directors to use in order to 
switch the burden of proof away from the taxpayer (and, 
accordingly, to the IRS) to show that a transaction with a 
disqualified person has not conveyed any “excess benefit.”53  The 
 
 48. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a) (2002) (defining an excess benefit 
transaction as one in which “an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-
exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified 
person, and the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the 
consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing the 
benefit.”). 
 49. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c) (2002) (classifying voting members of the 
governing body; presidents, chief executive officers, or chief operating officers; 
treasurers and chief financial officers; and persons with a material financial 
interest in a provider-sponsored organization as automatically having “substantial 
influence,” and providing a “facts and circumstances” test for others). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 53.4958-4(a). 
 52. Id. § 53.4958-4(b)(ii)(B)(1). 
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143; Treas. Reg. §53.4958- 6 (2002) (providing a rebuttable 
presumption that a transaction is not an excess benefit transaction). 
14
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so-called “safe harbor” is no more than an aspirational standard for 
appropriate due diligence when a conflict is noticed between the 
organization and parties who themselves hold, or have a 
relationship with someone who holds (or has been in the last sixty 
months able to exert), substantial influence over the organization.  
If the following procedures are undertaken, the amount of 
compensation paid to a “disqualified person” is presumed to be 
reasonable and/or a transfer of property between an exempt 
organization and a “disqualified person” is presumed to be at fair 
market value: 
1) The compensation arrangement or terms of the 
transfer are approved by the organization’s board of 
directors, or committee of the board or a properly 
authorized body independent of the disqualified person;54 
2) the decision-making board obtained and relied on 
appropriate data regarding comparability before making 
its determination;55 and 3) the decision-making body 
adequately documented the basis for its determination by 
the later of the next meeting of the decision-making 
body,56 or sixty days after final approval of the transaction 
by the decision-making body.57 
For organizations with less than $1 million of annual gross 
receipts, the authorized body will be deemed to have considered 
appropriate data on comparability of compensation if it has 
reviewed data on compensation paid by three similar groups for 
similar services.58 
In accord with the enactment of I.R.C. § 4958, Form 990 was 
modified to reflect the application of the statute.  Line 89b of Form 
990 asks 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) filers whether the reporting 
organization engaged in any “excess benefit transactions” during 
the reporting year, or whether it became aware of any “excess 
benefit transaction” from a prior year during the reporting year.  In 
addition to the specific reference to that excise tax scheme, it has 
long been the case that Part III of Schedule A59 of Form 990 asks 
 
 54. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1) (2002). 
 55. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2). 
 56. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i). 
 57. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii). 
 58. Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii). 
 59. The Schedule A is a required, six-page add-on to the annual return that is 
required of all 501(c)(3) organizations holding public charity classification.  
Schedule A (I.R.S. Form 990 or Form 990 E-Z) (2003), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990sa.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
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whether the organization has directly or indirectly engaged in 
certain described transactions, such as furnishing goods or services, 
during the reporting year, with a laundry list of individuals 
including directors and officers, substantial contributors, family 
members of those parties, etc. 60 
Enforcement of intermediate sanctions by the IRS has begun 
in earnest.  IRS Commissioner Everson submitted written testimony 
to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee in connection with a 
hearing on exempt organization reform on June 22, 2004.61  
Commissioner Everson’s testimony makes clear that the IRS has 
begun a new series of initiatives (including so-called “soft contacts” 
and limited audits), which are anticipated to touch at least 1,000 
charities in 2004.  The IRS intends to ask these charities for 
clarification about errors in their Form 990 filings or for 
information on how executive compensation and/or terms for 
transactions with insiders was set.  While the Commissioner makes 
clear that the IRS’s focus will be aimed at transactions and 
organizations who willfully flaunt the tax rules, most of the IRS’s 
initiatives are designed to reach---and will touch-–the more 
common and pedestrian charities, whose errors, if that, are 
inadvertent or sloppy, but certainly not malevolent.  Not 
announced at the hearing, but well-communicated by IRS officials 
in other ways these last few months, is that these 1,000 limited 
contacts or audits represent the tip of the iceberg, as the IRS 
expects to make a total of 11,000 contacts this year in total with 
exempt organizations.  This modus operandi is undoubtedly 
designed not only to show that “the sheriff is back in town” but also 
to educate and motivate those who have been sloppy or imperfect 
in complying with charity mandates (including management of 
compensation and insider transactions).  The goal of these efforts 
is to have errant charities undertake reforms and move faster to 
adopt best practices. 
 
 60. Schedule A, Part III, q. 2 asks if any enumerated transactions take place 
by asking “[d]uring the year, has the organization, either directly or indirectly, 
engaged in any of the following acts with any substantial contributors, trustees, 
directors, officers, creators, key employees, substantial contributors, or members 
of their families, or with any taxable organization with which any such person is 
affiliated as an officer, director, trustee or majority owner, or principal 
beneficiary?”  Id. 
 61. The IRS released the Commissioner’s testimony as a written document on 
June 21, 2004.  Available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=124186,00. 
html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). See also infra part II.F (discussing the impact of the 
Senate Finance Committee hearing). 
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As Lois Lerner, Director of the Exempt Organization Rulings 
and Agreements section of the IRS’ office for tax-exempt 
organizations, noted in comments made at the American Bar 
Association’s Tax Section Exempt Organization Committee 
meeting on May 7, 2004: 
We’re going to be targeting some high-risk areas-–loans to 
employees, deals between employees and organizations, 
compensation as compared to assets.  We will be following 
up with organizations that have checked the box saying 
they’ve been involved in excess benefit transactions.  
We’re also going to be following up on folks who haven’t 
checked any box with regard to excess benefit 
transactions.62  There are, I think, over 4,000 of the 
returns that we’ve looked at that don’t have anything 
checked.  And we thought, now, some of these people 
might have forgotten or made a mistake, but that’s an 
awful lot of them.  So we want to look behind why aren’t 
people checking the box.63 
As discussed earlier, IRS Commissioner Everson described 
several efforts that the IRS is undertaking, including an initiative to 
“explore the seemingly high compensation paid to individuals 
associated with some exempt organizations.”  He said that the 
initiative would be “aggressive,” would include both traditional 
examinations and compliance checks, and would aim to create 
“positive tension for organizations as they decide on compensation 
arrangements.”  He also reported on a market segment initiative, 
involving approximately 400 examinations, designed to provide the 
IRS with more accurate information of the degree of compliance 
by private foundations.  And, explaining that audit levels have 
fallen to historically low levels, he proposed to increase spending 
on audits of tax-exempt and government entities by seventeen 
percent by next year. 
 
 62. The question on Line 89b of the Form 990, to which Ms. Lerner refers in 
her comment, has two alternative check boxes:  one for “yes” and one for “no.”  
When neither is checked, the filing organization is considered to not have made a 
“complete” return and the accuracy of its reporting (failure to check equals a 
“maybe”?) will be subject to IRS review, at least for those who find themselves the 
subject of one of the announced initiatives to review such filers.  Available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 63. Lois Lerner, Edited Transcript of the May 7, 2004 ABA Tax Section EO 
Committee Meeting, 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 27 (2004). 
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F.  Recent Congressional Action 
Spurred in part by the significant changes brought about in 
the oversight of publicly traded entities by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,64 
Congress has continued to investigate charitable organizations’ 
practices, particularly with respect to excessive compensation and 
private inurement.  In 2003, two well-publicized reports harshly 
critical of how charity managers fail to guard against insider 
benefit, both in the private foundation and public charity 
communities, were published.65  Those reports, alongside the 
House of Representatives’ passage of H.R. 7,66 suggest that big 
changes are in the works for the charitable sector. 
Indications of the further regulation that Congress is 
 
 64. American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability (Sarbanes-
Oxley) Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7501-7266 (West Supp. 2004).  While most of 
the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not directly apply to nonprofit 
charitable organizations, many commentators have discussed the implications of 
the Act for the charitable sector.  See, e.g., Suzanne Ross McDowell, Should Nonprofit 
Organizations Adopt the Rules of Sarbanes-Oxley?, 16 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 1, July/Aug. 
2004; BOARDSOURCE & INDEPENDENT SECTOR,  THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2003), at http://indepedent 
sector.org/PDFs/sarbanesoxley.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter 
BOARDSOURCE]; Patrice A. Heinz, The Financial Reporting Practices of Nonprofits, 
ALLIANCE FOR CHILD. AND FAM’S SARBANES-OXLEY REP., Aug. 2003, at 
http://www.alliance1.org/Home/SOX_final_8-03.pdf; Thomas A. McLaughlin, 
For-Profit Spillover:  New Regulation and Independence, NONPROFIT TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, 
at http://static.highbeam.com/t/thenonprofittimes/february012003/forprofits 
pillovernewregulationofindependencetree/; Martin Michaelson, A New Era of 
Corporate Governance Bears Down on Higher Education, 11 TRUSTEESHIP 37 Jan./Feb. 
2003; Thomas Silk, Ten Emerging Principles of Governance of Nonprofit Corporations, 43 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 35 (2004). 
 65. CHRISTINE AHN ET AL., GEORGETOWN PUB. POLICY INST., FOUNDATION 
TRUSTEE FEES: USE AND ABUSE (2003), available at http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/ 
doc_pool/TrusteeFees.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).   Starting in October 2003 
and continuing into 2004, the Boston Globe ran a series of articles spotlighting 
private foundation abuses.  See, e.g., Beth Healey, Foundation’s Sale of Nonprofit 
Hospital a Windfall for Administrator, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at A42; Beth 
Healey et al., Charity Money Funding Perks, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2003, at A1; Beth 
Healey et al., Foundation Lawyers Enjoy Privileged Position, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 
2003, at A1; Beth Healey et al., Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at A1. 
 66. H.R. 7, 108th Cong. (2003).  The initial version of H.R. 7 would have 
strongly limited the administrative expenses of the private foundation community; 
in its passed version it did so more modestly, excluding from characterization as 
“qualifying distributions” (which in general must be paid out at a rate of 5% of all 
investment assets) three categories of administrative expenses: “indirect” 
administrative expenses, compensation exceeding $100,000 for specific categories 
of individuals, and certain air travel expenses.  Id. 
18
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contemplating emerged in testimony and preliminary legislative 
proposals that were discussed at a hearing held on June 22, 2004 
before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee.67  While many who 
testified at that hearing were more muted in their call for 
Congressional reforms,68 a bipartisan “Staff Draft,” issued jointly by 
the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Charles 
Grassley (R-IA) and the ranking Member, Senator Max Baucus (D-
MT), harshly criticized current nonprofit practices in three areas: 
tax evasion, governance, and operations.69 
With respect to the first arena – tax evasion – concern was 
expressed that tax shelter practices of an abusive nature have 
spread significantly to the charitable community.  Chairman 
Grassley said that there are “a growing number of individuals who 
knowingly set up a charity to evade taxes.”70  Senator Baucus 
criticized “charities engaging in abusive tax shelters.”71  IRS 
Commissioner Everson said that, if the abuses were not checked, 
“there is the risk that Americans not only will lose faith in and 
reduce support for charitable organizations, but that the integrity 
of our tax system also will be compromised.”72  The practices of 
concern fell into two main categories: outright tax fraud and 
sophisticated shelters.  It should be noted that included in the “tax 
fraud” category were reports of overvaluation (by donating 
taxpayers) of donated cars and other assets.  Any charity taking 
 
 67. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good 
Charities: Hearing before the S. Fin. Comm., 108th Cong. (2004), 
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing062204.htm (last visited on Aug. 10, 
2004) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
 68. In addition to the Commissioner of the IRS, Mark Everson, other key 
witnesses included William Josephson, Assistant Attorney General of New York 
(Charities Bureau); Diana Aviv, President and CEO, Independent Sector; Derek 
Bok, President Emeritus, Harvard University; and Mark Macella, on behalf of the 
National Association of State Charity Officials.  Id.  There also were other 
witnesses, including those whose identity was concealed, testifying about various 
types of fraud that they had participated in or witnessed.  Id. 
 69. The third problem described at the hearing, related to operations, 
addressed whether charities were devoting sufficient efforts towards achieving 
their charitable purpose.  Id.  As those underlying issues were not emphasized by 
the Committee’s Chair or Ranking member, nor the state witnesses, they are 
omitted from discussion here. 
 70. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/062204cg.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2004). 
 71. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/062204mb.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 72. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204me 
test.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
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donations of non-cash property (including intellectual property) 
will be well served to apply due diligence to the organization’s 
practices in this area. 
Governance reforms also occupy much attention in the Staff 
Draft.  Chairman Grassley spoke of the various failings witnessed 
(or awaiting disclosure) at charities where “poor governance or 
failure to abide [by] best practices” occurs.73  Senator Baucus 
criticized “inflated salaries” and “insider deals.”74  IRS 
Commissioner Everson (speaking for the current White House) 
started his testimony by addressing “the need for enhanced 
governance.”75 Invoking recent problems in the corporate sector, 
he said: 
In recent years there have been a number of very 
prominent and damaging scandals involving corporate 
governance of publicly traded organizations.  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has addressed major concerns about 
the interrelationships between a corporation, its 
executives, its accountants and auditors, and its legal 
counsel.  Although Sarbanes-Oxley was not enacted to address 
issues in tax-exempt organizations, these entities have not been 
immune from leadership failures.  We need go no further than our 
daily newspapers to learn that some charities and private 
foundations have their own governance problems.  Specifically, we 
have seen business contracts with related parties, unreasonably 
high executive compensation, and loans to executives. . . . All 
these reflect potential issues of ethics, internal oversight, and 
conflicts of interest.76 
Everson went on to specifically criticize “the governing boards of 
tax-exempt organizations [that] are not, in all cases, exercising 
sufficient diligence as they set compensation for the leadership of 
the organizations.”77 
The Staff Draft includes the following proposed regulatory 
changes related to exempt organization governance.  While these 
proposals have not been made law at this time,78 they provide 
 
 73. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov//hearings/statements/062204cg.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 74. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/062204mb.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 75. Id. at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204me 
test.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. 
 78. An invitation-only, closed-door hearing was scheduled by the U.S. Senate 
20
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insight into the breadth of the changes that are being 
contemplated.  In fact, they reveal that Congress is considering the 
need to extend the authority of the IRS into areas of nonprofit 
governance that have only been subject to State oversight in the 
past.  Some of the proposals would: 
 
(a) Change governance practices–-these will have to be 
adopted and maintained in order for 501(c)(3) status to be granted 
and/or continued: 
• Size of boards-–would require boards to consist of 
between three and fifteen members. 
• Boards would have to establish and oversee---basic 
organizational and management policies; program 
objectives and performance measures; the conduct of 
business, including approving significant transactions; 
accounting and auditing practices (including retaining 
of an independent auditor); review and approval of 
budgets. 
• Boards would be required to have conflict of interest 
policies and would be required to report annually on 
Form 990 a summary of determinations made under 
the policy. 
• Boards would have to establish and maintain a 
compliance program, and include in same procedures 
for reviewing complaints against the organization. 
 
(b) Increase transparency of board’s decision-making in 
general and specifically with respect to overseeing key staff and 
managing compensation: 
• Organizations would be required to report how often 
the Board of Directors met, including how often the 
meeting occurred without the CEO (or equivalent) 
present. 
• New safe harbors and ceilings for compensation to 
certain individuals would be created (in some cases 
mandatory IRS review would be required); in addition, 
annual review by the board and public disclosure of 
supporting materials considered in setting 
 
Finance Committee on July 22, 2004 as a follow-up.  The American Bar Association 
prepared comments on the Staff Draft for that hearing, many of which urged 
Congressional restraint.  See ABA LETTER, supra note 35. 
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compensation would be required. 
 
(c) Require every tax-exempt organization to undergo a 
review, every five years, to determine “whether the organization 
continues to be organized and operated exclusively for an exempt 
purpose.”79 
 
(d) Permit IRS to share confidential taxpayer information with 
state regulators. 
 
(e) Create new rights of action, allowing states, directors, or 
private individuals to bring an action against a charitable 
organization for violating federal tax and other requirements. 
 
(f) Require an organization’s Form 990 to be reviewed by a so-
called “independent auditor”; increase penalties for failing to file 
timely and create new penalties for errors in reporting on the form. 
 
(g) Require the CEO of an exempt organization to sign a 
statement that the CEO had put procedures in place that would 
ensure that the organization’s filings with the IRS complied with 
the tax laws. 
 
(h) For all charities, limit expenses for travel, meals, and 
accommodation to the applicable federal governmental rate. 
 
(i) Establish a new series of federal standards or “best 
practices” for the governance of tax-exempt organizations.  The 
basic standard is akin to the standard already enunciated in 
Minnesota law for nonprofit corporations, but breach of the new 
standards would bring federal liability: 
In performing duties, a Board member has to perform his 
or her duties in good faith; with the care an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
 
 79. It is interesting that the President/CEO of Independent Sector, Diana 
Aviv, seemed to support some version of this proposal, noting that “there is an 
interest by some in a more thorough examination of a sampling of public charities 
from time to time to ascertain whether the organizations continue to meet the 
requirements for recognition as charitable tax-exempt organizations.”  Hearings, 
supra note 67. 
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mission, goals, and purposes of the corporation.  An 
individual who has special skills or expertise has a duty to 
use such skills or expertise.80 
III. WHAT THE DEVELOPMENTS PORTEND REGARDING “DEMANDS 
FOR INCREASED CAPACITY” 
Nonprofit board governance has always been subject to 
oversight by a combination of state and federal laws and 
regulations.  In the wake of some abuses of nonprofit organizations 
by key staff and governors in both the for-profit and nonprofit 
worlds, oversight by governmental authorities is stepping up.  In 
addition, public awareness of and interest in issues of nonprofit 
governance has increased.  Lois Lerner, in her remarks to the ABA 
Tax Section Exempt Organization Committee in May 2004, noted 
that the increased availability of information about charitable 
organizations to state and federal regulators and to the public will 
act to discourage organization managers from abusing their 
positions as insiders of their organizations: 
I mean [there is] more and better information out there 
about the organizations.  If the information is out there 
and available to the IRS, to the public, to state regulating 
organizations, we think that that’s going to provide for 
broader oversight and, again, a little bit more focused 
thinking on the part of those people who run the 
organizations and those of you who deal with the 
organizations.  We think it will actually help you in your 
job to explain to the folks who are coming in to talk to 
you that what you’re doing is going to be out there, it’s 
going to be available, you’re going to be reading about 
yourself in the paper, and you want it to be positive rather 
than negative.81 
The June 2004 hearing before the U.S. Senate Finance 
Committee and new initiatives undertaken by the IRS indicate that 
board governance will remain a key focus of interest and increased 
regulation.  The trend on both the state and federal levels appears 
to be two-pronged: providing more and better information to 
charitable organizations on existing law and best practices for 
 
 80.  SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT (2004), available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 81. Lerner, supra note 63. 
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governance; and, particularly with the federal developments that 
have been discussed above, increased enforcement efforts to 
emphasize how serious a matter the responsible fiduciary control of 
charitable funds is. 
A.  Duty of Care Recommendations 
Nonprofit charitable organizations would do well to review 
their governance practices to ensure that they are compliant with 
whatever new regulatory arrangements result from the current 
concerns over accountability.82  Several commentators have 
recommended specific steps in this area.83  In particular, in the area 
of compliance with the fiduciary duty of care, the authors 
recommend that charitable organizations should: 
 
(a) Recruit knowledgeable board members with skills 
in financial, programmatic and other substantive areas 
relevant to the applicable organization; 
 
(b) Educate board members regarding their duties and 
encourage them to actively question management and 
outside advisors on any “red flags” they see; 
 
(c) Ensure that board members know and follow 
written policies and procedures of the organization, and 
that they ensure that management complies with these as 
well; 
 
(d) Educate potential board members about the 
commitment and responsibilities that their service will 
entail; 
 
(e) Develop internal controls that require 
management to report significant events to the board, and 
 
 82. See, e.g., MINN. ATT’Y GEN., FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS OF CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/charities/char 
Duties.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) (providing information that is relevant to 
board members’ fiduciary duties). 
 83. See, e.g., Silk, supra note 64; BOARDSOURCE, supra note 64.  In addition, the 
authors would like to acknowledge the benefit of the recommendations made by 
Nancy Evert, in Best Practices for Governance and Management of Charitable 
Organizations in a Post-Enron Environment, Address at the Minnesota Council of 
Nonprofits Annual Conference (Oct. 2, 2003). 
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that specifies size or kinds of transactions that require board 
approval; 
 
(f) Develop board self-evaluation mechanism (with the 
opportunity for input from staff and management) to 
ensure effective operation of the board, its committees and 
its individual directors; 
 
(g) For larger organizations, consider the 
appropriateness of an outside “independent” audit 
committee: “independent” meaning composed of directors 
who are without ties to management or the auditor, without 
conflicts of interest, and who are not compensated.  This 
committee would be charged with reviewing the audit in 
detail, hiring and supervising the auditor’s work with the 
organization, and ensuring that complaint procedures are 
in place for issues related to financial management of the 
corporation.  They may also be responsible for risk 
management oversight. 
B.  Duty of Loyalty Recommendations 
To comply with the fiduciary duty of loyalty, charitable 
organizations should identify meaningful ways to encourage board 
members, officers and staff to embrace the variety of resources they 
bring to the organization, but acknowledge at the same time that 
these connections inevitably lead to divided loyalties or “conflicts of 
interest.”  In the authors’ experience, the title “conflict of interest” 
in the heading of Minnesota Statutes section 317A.25584 and 
analogous other state statutes is too often read as defining the only 
situations in which a director must provide notice of a “conflict of 
interest.”  A director’s withholding of information concerning a 
real, or even potential “conflict of interest” that falls outside of the 
statute’s narrow list of voidable transactions, may still comprise a 
breach of fiduciary duty to the extent that it prevents the 
corporation from evaluating whether an undertaking is in the best 
interest of the corporation. 
The statute correctly underscores that transactions between 
the corporation and directors, their family members, or 
organizations that are related to directors, as well as between 
 
 84. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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organizations related to the corporation and directors, their family 
and related organizations, are the most susceptible of conflict.85 
However, our experience has shown that those are not the only 
scenarios in which a director may have other interests that could be 
at odds with the charge to serve the corporation’s “best interests” 
(in accord with the overarching standard of care from which the 
three duties being discussed in this part emanate).  Loyalty with 
respect to serving the corporation and its best interests 
encompasses ongoing obligations well beyond managing the 
conflict scenarios with respect to whether the corporation meets 
one’s own (or other so-called “insiders”) interests. 
We recommend the following specific steps in this regard: 
 
(a) Adopt a substantive conflict of interest policy that 
addresses at minimum three types of transactions: 
      
(1) Direct and  
(2) indirect related-party transactions with officers 
and/or directors, including in this tier as ‘indirect-
related party transactions’ those that occur with 
“close family members” of officers and/or directors, 
other individuals or with non-501(c)(3) 
organizations with which officers and/or directors 
or their “close family members” are affiliated. 
(3) Perceived conflict of interest transactions. 86 
 
(b) Document, with respect to any such related-party 
transactions, the pool of others who have been given 
consideration for the same opportunity, along with relevant 
features of their offers, reasons for choosing related party, 
and have the fact of a related-party’s involvement, along 
with full facts thereof disclosed along with the other 
 
 85. MINN. STAT. § 317A.255 (2004). 
 86. See SAMPLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY, supra note 40.  A different 
sample conflict of interest policy that encompasses the three tiers of transactions 
noted here, direct and indirect related-party transactions and a broader group of 
situations in which board members, officers and staff may have dual allegiances to 
the nonprofit organization they serve and to personal interests may be found on 
the authors’ website, http://www.bamlawoffice.com/pdf/sample_coi_policy.pdf.  
Note that neither policy, however, sets out the procedures that are necessary to 
avail the corporation of the so-called “intermediate sanctions safe-harbors” for 
direct and indirect related-party transactions reached by I.R.C. § 4958. 
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information here in advance of the meeting in which the 
decision is to be made.  (Note that in the case of tier-1 
transactions, it may be necessary for the Board to procure 
independent comparability data to evaluate as part of 
setting the transaction’s terms, to avoid excise tax liability 
under I.R.C. § 4958.)87 
 
(c) Set a higher threshold for approving the 
transaction (for example, requiring same to be approved by 
2/3 of the uninterested directors, rather than the majority 
that would typically be required for an act of the Board), 
and document all votes yea or nay on the transaction. 
 
(d) Have Board members regularly review the 
organizations with which they have a “material financial 
interest,” and the pool of connections their “close family 
members” (as the corporation’s policy has defined those 
individuals) have with other individuals and/or 
organizations in which they hold a “material financial 
interest.” 
 
(e) Document, with respect to any compensation issues 
with insiders, that compensation is reasonable based on 
objective data; that only uninterested directors considered 
the data and how the Board arrived at a decision about it; 
and who was at the meeting approving the compensation. 
C. Duty of Obedience Recommendations 
To ensure that the organization complies with the duty of 
obedience, charitable organizations should develop a method by 
which directors are educated regarding the governmental filings 
that are required, and understand what mechanisms are in place 
each year to ensure that same are timely and accurately filed.  Of 
particular importance for fiduciaries in the current climate is 
planning to bring appropriate review to the organization’s 
completed Annual Return of Exempt Organization (i.e., Forms 
990, 990-EZ and 990-PF).  The authors anticipate from the clear 
trend of the law in this area, as well as likely calls for increased 
 
 87. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
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disclosure of charity’s governance capacity on such filings88, that 
fiduciaries of charitable organizations will be expected to know 
what information is disclosed about the organization’s activities and 
undertakings (including transactions with insiders) on these filings.  
Undertaking educational initiatives89 now with boards, as well as 
with internal reviewers and/or paid preparers of Form 990 series 
filings, would be a valuable proactive step, particularly given that 
these filings are now, as discussed above, the focus of both 
increased IRS enforcement review and public scrutiny. 
 
 
 88. For example, the July 19, 2004 ABA submission to the Senate Finance 
Committee hearing supported in large part the recommendation in the 
Committee’s Staff Draft that additional governance focus be advanced through the 
addition of new Form 990 series questions.  ABA LETTER, supra note 35.  The ABA 
letter states that the “concept in the Discussion Draft that the Form 990 could be 
used as a vehicle to promote strong governance and best practices is appealing for 
a number of reasons. . . . including a governance section on the Form 990 would 
allow the IRS to educate charities on the importance of this issue . . . .”  Id.  The 
same submission also made the suggestion that “Form 990 might also include a 
check-box affirmation that copies of Form 990 were provided to each member of 
the EO’s governing body.”  Id. at 5. 
 89. Over the course of the last several years, various initiatives have developed 
to encourage improved education of board members and officers on the Form 990 
filing that is required for almost all exempt organizations (the chief exception 
from the filing requirement is for churches) whose gross receipts average more 
than $25,000 a year.  For example, in 2001 a group of representatives of the 
Minnesota Attorney General's office, the private bar (including the authors), the 
CPA community, and finance officers of Minnesota charities began working 
together as the Minnesota Nonprofit Accountability Collaborative (“NAC”).  The 
group designed workshops and publications on the theme "Making Your Form 990 
Work for You."  That effort, which culminated in 2003, yielded eight workshop 
presentations to date and produced two technical assistance publications for lay 
readers, including "Tips for Telling the Truth---a Form 990 Tool,” available at 
http://www.crcmn.org/npresources/truthtips.pdf.  This publication addresses the 
four priority areas that the NAC found that 990 preparers were in need of the 
most education:  explicating program service accomplishments; documenting and 
disclosing expenses appropriately under the Statement of Functional Expenses; 
understanding what comprises reportable fundraising expenses; and disclosing 
insider transactions and compensation.  Id. 
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